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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Notice of Appeal in this case was sent to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)G). Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court has issued an order retaining the case in the Utah
Supreme Court effective March 23, 2016.

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STAND ARDS OF REVIEW

I.

ISSUES RELATED TO IMPLIED WARRANTY CLAIMS AND B.A.
CRITCHFIELD CONSTRUCTION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

ISSUE No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that contractual privity
between the Developer and the Association is not established through the
Association's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions and/or the
original Real Estate Purchase Contracts.
"When reviewing a summary judgment by the district court, we must examine all
of the facts presented and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. If there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment is
appropriate. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We grant no deference to the district court's
conclusions of law and review them for correctness." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co.,
2003 UT 8,120, 70 P.3d 1, 6. This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 4092-4098.

ISSUE No. 2: Whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that the Association's expert
report was insufficient to establish a question of "safety" or "habitability."
"When reviewing a summary judgment by the district court, we must examine all
of the facts presented and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. If there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
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the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment is
appropriate. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We grant no deference to the district court's
conclusions of law and review them for correctness." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co.,
2003 UT 8, ,I 20, 70 P.3d 1, 6. This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 4092-4098.
II.

ISSUES RELATED TO FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS AND THE
DEVELOPERS' MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.

ISSUE No. 3: Whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that expert testimony is
required to establish a standard of care for purposes of Davencourt limited fiduciary
duty claims.

"This [c]ourt's standard of review of a directed verdict is the same as that imposed
upon a trial court." Management Comm. ofGraystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P .2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). A trial court is justified in
granting a directed verdict only if, examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the
non-moving party's favor. Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, 13,975 P.2d 467,
468. This issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 9818-9823.
ISSUE No. 4: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Defendant Jeffrey Duke
was entitled to indemnification.

"Questions of contract interpretation which are confined to the language of the
contract itself are questions of law, which we review for correctness." Hillcrest Inv. v.
Sandy City, a municipal corporation, 2010 UT App 201, ,I 7, 238 P.3d 1067, 1069. This
issue was preserved in the trial court at R. 10099-10103.

2
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-6a-603(2). Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act
-Members.
(1) The bylaws may establish:
(a) criteria or procedures for admission of members; and

(b) the procedure for replacing:
(i) a member; or
(ii) a membership interest.
(2) A person may not be admitted as a member without the person's consent.

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-6a-822. Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation ActDirectors and Officers.
(1) (a) A director shall discharge the director's duties as a director, including the
director's duties as a member of a committee of the board, in accordance with
Subsection (2).

(b) An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge the officer's duties under
that authority in accordance with Subsection (2).
(2) A director or an officer described in Subsection (1) shall discharge the director or
officer's duties:
(a) in good faith;
(b) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances; and
(c) in a manner the director or officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the nonprofit corporation.
(3) In discharging duties, a director or officer is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if
prepared or presented by:
(a) one or more officers or employees of the nonprofit corporation whom the director
or officer reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters
presented;
(b) legal counsel, a public accountant, or another person as to matters the director or
officer reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert
competence;
(c) religious authorities or ministers, priests, rabbis, or other persons:

3
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(i) whose position or duties in the nonprofit corporation, or in a religious
organization with which the nonprofit corporation is affiliated, the director or
officer believes justify reliance and confidence; and

(ii) who the director or officer believes to be reliable and competent in the
matters presented; or
(d) in the case of a director, a committee of the board of directors of which the
director is not a member if the director reasonably believes the committee merits
confidence.
(4) A director or officer is not acting in good faith if the director or officer has knowledge
concerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by
Subsection (3) unwarranted.
(5) A director, regardless of title, may not be considered to be a trustee with respect to
any property held or administered by the nonprofit corporation including property that
may be subject to restrictions imposed by the donor or transferor of the property.
(6) A director or officer is not liable to the nonprofit corporation, its members, or any
conservator or receiver, or any assignee or successor-in-interest of the nonprofit
corporation or member, for any action taken, or any failure to take any action, as an
officer or director, as the case may be, unless:
(a) the director or officer has breached or failed to perform the duties of the office as
set forth in this section; and
(b) the breach or failure to perform constitutes:
(i) willful misconduct; or
(ii) intentional infliction of harm on:
(A) the nonprofit corporation; or
(B) the members of the nonprofit corporation; or
(iii) gross negligence.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-8-7.5. Condominium Ownership Act-Reserve
Analysis-Reserve Fund.
( 1) As used in this section:
(a) "Reserve analysis" means an analysis to determine:
(i) the need for a reserve fund to accumulate reserve funds; and
(ii) the appropriate amount of any reserve fund.
(b) "Reserve fund line item" means the line item in an association of unit owners'
annual budget that identifies the amount to be placed into a reserve fund.
(c) "Reserve funds" means money to cover the cost of repairing, replacing, or
4
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restoring common areas and facilities that have a useful life of three years or
more and a remaining useful life of less than 30 years, if the cost cannot
reasonably be funded from the general budget or other funds of the association of
unit owners.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in the declaration, a management committee shall:
(a) cause a reserve analysis to be conducted no less frequently than every six years;
and
(b) review and, if necessary, update a previously conducted reserve analysis no less
frequently than every three years.
(3) The management committee may conduct a reserve analysis itself or may engage a
reliable person or organization, as determined by the management committee, to
conduct the reserve analysis.
(4) A reserve fund analysis shall include:
(a) a list of the components identified in the reserve analysis that will reasonably
require reserve funds;
(b) a statement of the probable remaining useful life, as of the date of the reserve
analysis, of each component identified in the reserve analysis;
(c) an estimate of the cost to repair, replace, or restore each component identified in
the reserve analysis;
( d) an estimate of the total annual contribution to a reserve fund necessary to meet
the cost to repair, replace, or restore each component identified in the reserve
analysis during the component's useful life and at the end of the component's
useful life; and
(e) a reserve funding plan that recommends how the association of unit owners may
fund the annual contribution described in Subsection (4 )(d).

UT AH CODE ANN. § 78B-4-513(2008). Cause of action for defective
construction.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), an action for defective design or construction is
limited to breach of the contract, whether written or otherwise, including both express
and implied warranties.
(2) An action for defective design or construction may include damage to other property
or physical personal injury if the damage or injury is caused by the defective design or
construction.
(3) For purposes of Subsection (2), property damage does not include:
(a) the failure of construction to function as designed; or
(b) diminution of the value of the constructed property because of the defective
5
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design or construction.
(4) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (6), an action for defective design or
construction may be brought only by a person in privity of contract with the original
contractor, architect, engineer, or the real estate developer.
(5) If a person in privity of contract sues for defective design or construction under this
section, nothing in this section precludes the person from bringing, in the same suit,
another cause of action to which the person is entitled based on an intentional or
willful breach of a duty existing in law.
(6) Nothing in this section precludes a person from assigning a right under a contract to
another person, including to a subsequent owner or a homeowners association
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Gables at Sterling Village ("the Project") is a planned unit development
located in the city of South Jordan, Utah, comprised of 78 residential units in 15
buildings. The Gables at Sterling Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (the
"Association") is the homeowners association governing the Project. All owners of units
in the Project are automatically members of the Association ("Members").
Jeffrey A. Duke ("Duke") developed the Project through a series of related entities
he created, owned, and managed which bore the "Castlewood" name. CastlewoodSterling Village I, LLC, acquired the properties which would ultimately become the
Project. Castlewood Development, LLC engaged in the actual development work on the
project. 1 The residential units ("Units") and appurtenant common areas were built by
Castlewood Builders, LLC ("Builders").
Duke established the Association on June 28, 2006, by recording the Declaration
of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Gables at Sterling Village, A Planned Unit
1

Castlewood-Sterling Village I, LLC; Castlewood Development, LLC; Castlewood
Development, Inc; and Jeffrey A. Duke are sometimes referred to collectively herein as
the "Developers."
6
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Development ("Declaration"). This Declaration, along with the Association's Bylaws,
governs the Association, its Board of Directors, and its Members.
The Declaration provides that the Association is responsible for among other
things, the maintenance, repair, and replacement of the exterior surfaces and roofs of the
units. In order to fulfill its obligation to maintain, repair, and replace these common areas,
the Association is legally obligated to set money aside as reserves to provide for the long
term costs associated with this obligation. In addition to funding the reserve account, the
monthly assessments are used to cover the costs of ordinary Association budget expenses.
Under the terms of the Declaration, the Developers would retain control of the
Association until a certain number of the units had been sold (the "Period of Developer
Control"). During the Period of Developer Control, the Association board consisted of
Duke, Dan Lybbert and Darren Mansell. Duke and Dan Lybbert were principals of the
Developers and Builders, and Darren Mansell was a realtor who marketed the Units.
The Developers turned over control of the Association to its Members on January
1, 2008. Shortly after turnover, the Association discovered that there were defects in the
construction of the portions of buildings for which the Association bore maintenance and
repair responsibility. Worse, the Association learned that the defects required extensive
repairs and that the Association did not have nearly enough money in reserves to cover
the repair costs. The Association's expert witnesses identified defects throughout the
Association's buildings and Units, and estimated the cost to repair at approximately
$490,000.00. The Developers retained an expert who also identified construction defects,
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and estimated the cost of repair to be approximately $890,000.00. This report was entered
into evidence in Plaintiffs case in chief.
The Association filed this suit against the Builders, Developers, and individual
principals of each in 2010, alleging that the Builders had breached the implied warranty
of habitability by defectively building the buildings and Units, and that Developers had
breached their fiduciary duties to the Association by among other things, failing to
establish a sound fiscal basis the Association during the Period of Developer Control.
Builders brought third-party claims against a number of subcontractors.
Third-Party Defendant subcontractor B.A. Critchfield Construction ("Critchfield")
filed a motion for summary judgment against the Association seeking to dismiss the
Association's implied warranty claims. The trial court granted Critchfield's motion
holding that the Association lacked privity of contract with the other parties, and because
in the trial court's estimation, the Association's expert reports did not contain enough
information to determine whether the defects presented a question of safety or
habitability. Following the trial court's order, the other subcontractors filed similar
motions which were similarly granted. The trial court's orders granting the various
motions for summary judgment did not expressly address the Association's implied
warranty claims against Builders.
The trial court's ruling on Critchfield's motion for summary judgment was
erroneous in at least two respects and should be reversed. First, the Association enjoys
privity of contract with the Developers through the Declaration, and as a third-party
beneficiary to the Real Estate Purchase Contracts ("REPCs") and deeds between the
8
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Developers and the homeowners. In addition, the trial court should have held that the
Association's expert reports adequately established that the alleged defects presented
safety or habitability concerns because the trial court was required to consider all
inferences in a light most favorable to the Association as the non-moving party.
At trial, the Association called three expert witnesses and three licensed
professionals that testified regarding the defects, the cost of repair, and the safety and
habitability concerns they presented. As noted above, Defendant's expert report was
entered into evidence, memorializing an $890,000.00 deficit. The Association also
established a prima facie case that the Developers grossly underfunded the Association
and therefore breached their limited fiduciary duties as defined by the Utah Supreme
Court in Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims
Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65,221 P.3d 234.
Despite the Association's compelling case the trial court granted Duke's motion
for directed verdict ruling that " ... expert testimony is ... required as a matter of law for
Plaintiff to demonstrate the appropriate standard of care and duties owed by a developer
where it establishes and initially controls a homeowners association." That ruling was in
error and should be reversed.
Finally, the trial court erred in its ruling that Duke is entitled to indemnification
because the indemnification clause Duke relies upon does not arise solely from his
having served on the board of the Association, but also from his role as a Developer.
Additionally, indemnification clauses like the one Duke relies upon should not be
enforced as a matter of public policy. Finally, Duke did not pursue his indemnification
9
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counterclaim at trial, and should have been foreclosed from pursuing his claim via posttrial motion.
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's rulings and orders on Critchfield's
motion for summary judgment, the Developers' motions for directed verdict, and Duke's
motion for indemnification are all in error and should be reversed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL

I.

FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE
ASSOCIATION'S IMPLIED WARRANTY CLAIMS AND
CRITCHFIELD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2
The Project is a planned unit development located in the city of South Jordan,

Utah, comprised of 78 residential units in 15 buildings. 3 The Association is the
4

homeowners association governing the Project. The Association was formed upon the
recording of the Declaration, recorded June 28, 2006. 5 All owners of Units in the Project
are Members of the Association. 6

A. Duke and his Castlewood entities developed and built the Project.
Duke developed the Project through a series of related entities bearing the
7

"Castlewood" name. Duke established and operated three Castlewood entities to
develop and build the Project, including Castlewood Development, LLC, 8 Castlewood-

2

The following facts were undisputed and in evidence at the time of Critchfield's Motion
for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff HOA.
3
R. at 10574.
4
See Addendum 1.

s Id.
Id. at 2.
7
R. at 10644-10647.
8
R. at 10644-45 (later converted to Castlewood Development, Inc.).

6
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Sterling Village I, LLC, and Castlewood Builders, LLC. 9 Duke also established the
Association and possessed ultimate authority in setting the original assessment of the
Association during the Period of Developer Control. 10

B. The construction on the Project was defective.
Even before turnover, the Association's Members contacted the Builders and
Developers regarding warranty items and defects but the Builders and Developers would
not respond to the homeowners' calls. 11 The Association provided the punch list to
Builders and Developers. 12 Most of the severe items on the list were never addressed by
Builders or Developers. 13 Some of the more severe defects noticed by homeowners
included settled concrete with large voids underneath the concrete, gouges in the roads,
stucco on ~he decks that was peeling off, and stones that were falling off the pillars. 14
Virtually all of these defects manifested themselves within a year after the Units were
completed. 15
The Association's expert witnesses identified a number of defects in the
construction, and estimated a cost of repair totaling approximately $4,900,000 16 • The
Developers' experts admitted that there were defects and estimated the total cost of repair

9

R. at 9163.
R. at 10646, 10715.
11
R. at 10882.
12
R. at 10602-03; See Addendum 2.
13
R. at 10603.
14
R. at 10603.
15
R. at 10603.
16
See Addendum 3.
10
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at approximately $890,000.00. 17
C. The Association sued the Developers for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, and
the Builder for Breach of Implied Warranty.
On March 12, 2010, the Association filed its First Amended Complaint against
Developers and Builders. 18 The Association alleged breaches of implied warranties
against Builders and breaches of limited fiduciary duties against Developers. 19 Builders
brought third-party claims against various subcontractors, including Critchfield. 20
II.

ADDITIONAL FACTS ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL, INCLUDING
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE DEVELOPERS' MOTIONS FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT. 21
A. Facts regarding construction defects
Though there are problems with a number of different components and building

systems, the most severe construction defects affecting the Association involve defective
concrete and defective decks.
1.

22

Defective Concrete

There are severe concrete problems that have manifested throughout the
Association. 23 The Association hired licensed contractor Tim Savage to repair some of

17

See Addendum 4.
R. at 40-66.
19
R. at 40-66.
20
R. at 125-144.
21
Many of the following facts were developed through trial testimony that was not
available at the time ofB.A. Critchfield Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment.
22
R. at 10601, 10603.
23
See Addendum 5. For photos that demonstrate the defective concrete and repair costs,
see Addendum 6.
18
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the concrete damage at the Gables as early as 2010. 24 Mr. Savage testified at trial that
"[i]n my experience, it should last- a good job should last 40 years." 25 When asked: "So
when you first walked out on the site at this project, what was your impression of the
concrete? Mr. Savage responded: "Sloppy ... Meaning poor workmanship. There was a
lot of problems, bucking and heaving and settling." 26 Mr. Savage further testified that
"[t]here's an awful lot of settling up around the foundations that I think has just come
from backfilling and leaving it going and pouring concrete on." 27 When asked how the
work on this project compares to other projects he had worked on during his 45 years in
the business, Mr. Savage responded that "[i]t's deplorable ... there were 75 units and
there wasn't one of them that we found so far that was done properly." 28
Due to the Association's lack of funding, Savage Construction has corrected only
the most urgent safety issues, and in Mr. Savage's words, there were "a lot of safety
issues." 29 Mr. Sucher testified that the Association has repaired only "a small portion of
it, just doing the most urgent repairs where driveways have collapsed and are not drivable
or present a safety issue." 30 Repairing only the most serious and urgent concrete issues
has cost the Association $89,310.50. 31 Unfortunately, now the remaining unrepaired
concrete defects are causing other problems such as leaking foundations caused by the

24

R.
R.
26
R.
27
R.
28
R.

at 10632.
at 10862-63.
at 10845.
at 10846.
at 10864-65.
29
R. at 10849-51.
30
R. at 10607.
31
R. at 10607.

25
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settling concrete shearing off water lines. 32 At trial, it was estimated that the cost to repair
the remaining concrete defects will be $300,011.70. 33

2.

Defective Decks

Defective decks present life-threatening safety problems to the residents of the
Association. 34 Jason Sucher, the Association's property manager, testified regarding the
decks:
We've actually had severe problems with those decks.
They've split and they've failed in such a way that they've
become unsafe. We've had some to the point where they've
rotted the wood completely through to where they're unsafe
to walk on. And so we've had to do a significant amount of
repairs on those decks. We've hired contractors to come in
and put down a temporary surface on them to protect them
from - you know, replace the rotted wood and protect them
so that the people are safe to walk on them. But, you know,
we started having to replace those decks with only - within a
couple years after the project was completed. 35
Mr. Sucher further testified that

We've had some, really, kind of a unique settling issue where
the posts that support the front decks have settled. They didn't
have a proper footing underneath them. They've settled down
into the ground. And so in doing so, the decks have become
unstable where they're, you know, don't have the post in the
middle of them. And so we've had to break open the
driveways, excavate below the posts and install piers to raise
them back up and support the decks. 36

32

R. at 10617-18.
R. at 10790.
34
R. at 10600-01. For photos showing deck and post damages and accompanying repair
costs, see Addendum 7.
35
R. at 10600-01.
36
R. at 10609.
33
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The Association was forced to make emergency deck repairs as early as 2011 and
continued into 2012 and 2013, with the most urgent decks being only temporarily
repaired due to a lack of funds. 37 So far, the association has temporarily repaired 36 of
the 78 decks. 38 The temporary deck repairs have cost the Association $80,530. 39 The
Association has insufficient funds to repair the remaining decks. 40
B. Duke and the Developers knew or should have known about the defects.
The Project was built by a Duke-controlled Castlewood entity named Castlewood
Builders, LLC. 41 During the construction phase, Duke did not hire any construction
inspectors, and no inspections were conducted outside the required city and bank
inspections. 42 Duke testified that on most of his projects he routinely uses an architect
during the construction process to ensure quality control, but does not know if one was
used at the Project to ensure the Project was built in compliance with building codes,
plans, and specifications. 43 Duke testified that he does not blame the architect for any of
the defects or design issues, but admitted there were "missteps" onsite. 44 Duke admitted
that the Project was built with construction defects 45

37

R. at 10632.
R. at 10608.
39
R. at 10608.
40
R. at 10617-18.
41
R. at 10646-47.
42
R. at 10642.
43
R. at 10669-70.
44
R. at 10670. 10701.
45
R. at 10670.
38
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The Castlewood entities ignored the homeowners' phone calls and warranty punch
list items prior to turnover. 46 Duke knew of the Project's collapsible soils that would
eventually cause concrete upheaval and deck instability because he read the geotechnical
report, which required extra precautions to alleviate the collapsible soils.

47

Greg Moffat, a Castlewood employee, was responsible for supervising the
construction at the Project. 48 However, Moffat quit working for Castlewood during
construction of the Project. 49 After Moffat quit Castlewood Builders, Duke never spoke
to Moffat about any construction problems, issues, inspections, concerns, code violations,
etc. 50 Dan Lybbert testified that he was unaware of any construction inspections during
the construction of the Gables. 51
C. Duke ignored defects in the name of quick profit for himself and investors.
Duke and the Developers borrowed money from investors to fund the construction
of the Project. 52 Duke admitted that the faster Castlewood built the Gables, the more
money Duke would make for Castlewood and his investors. 53 Duke was behind schedule
in building the Project 54 and failed to perform an evaluation of the construction quality
before paying the investors. 55 Duke paid investors as the project was ongoing, rather than

46

R. at 10882.
R. at 10696-97.
48
R. at 11152.
49
R. at 10662.
50
R. at 10662.
51
R. at 11152.
52
R. at 10685-88.
53
R. at 10689.
54
R. at 10685.
55
R. at 10684.
47
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waiting until the end when all costs would be known and accounted for. 56 Investors in the
Project invested a total of $2.3 million and the investors made a 24% profit on their
investment. 57
D. Duke underfunded the association, which is now broke as a result of the
defects.
Before turnover, Duke set the assessment levels without any consideration of the
quality of construction or lack thereof or whether the Project was built according to the
applicable building codes, plans, and specifications. 58 Instead, Duke set the amount of the
assessment to be competitive in the marketplace. 59 In first setting the amount for monthly
per-unit assessments, Duke allocated only $13 per month for the reserve account. 60 Even
that amount was based on the assumption that the Project was built correctly. 61

Mr. Sucher testified extensively regarding the Association's dire financial
circumstances due to inadequate funding and numerous necessary repairs to correct
dangerous construction defects. In 2008, the Association was unable to contribute any
amount of assessments to the reserve savings account and in fact, the Association was
forced to spend all of the operating funds. 62 In fact, the Association was forced to take
money out of its already limited reserves account to fund the most critical repairs. 63
Again in 2009, the Association was unable to contribute any amount of assessments to
56

R. at 10683-84.
R. at 10680-81.
58
R. at 10641.
59
R. at 10641-42.
60
R. at 10590-91; see Addendum 8.
61
R. at 10591.
62
R. at 10611-12.
63
R. at 10611-12.

57
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the reserve savings account. 64 In 2010, there was only $3,155 in the operating account,
$2,128 in the reserve account and $15,000 in the reserve maintained by the board.

65

Even assuming that construction of the Project were defect free, the reserve study
conducted in 2011 indicated that the Association should have at least $136,000 in its
reserve account. 66 In 2011, there was $3,035 in the operating account, and $15,000 in the
reserve account. 67 In 2012, the Association ended the year with $1,482 in the operating
account, $314 in a special assessment account, and $4,664 in its reserve account. 68 At the
end of 2013, the Association had $3,000 in the operating account, $6,514 in the special
assessment account, and $16,793 in reserves. 69 At end of 2014, the Association had
$10,121 in its operating account, $0.56 in its special assessment account, and $5,000 in
its reserve account. 70 At the end of 2015, the Association had $2,000 in the operating
account, and $201,579 remaining in reserves from the Lybbert and Mansell settlement. 71
Mr. Sucher further testified that the Gables suffered extreme financial difficulty

immediately after turnover. When asked when the Association first started experiencing
financial problems, Mr. Sucher responded:
Probably the most severe problems started manifesting
themselves in 2009, 2010. We did start realizing we were
having pretty severe problems in 2008 about midway through
the year. We started compiling a list of the concerns and the
64

R.
R.
66
R.
67
R.
68
R.
69
R.
70
R.
71
R.

65

at 10612.
at 10613-14; see Addendum 9.
at 10615.
at 10614.
at 10615.
at 10616.
at 10616.
at 10617.
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problems, warranty complaints that we had throughout the
community and provided those to Castlewood somewhere
midway through 2008. 72
When asked about what he considers to be the biggest challenge facing the
Association, Mr. Sucher testified that:
Well, financially, it's been difficult . . . to operate the
association in a positive, long-term maintenance fashion
because ... all the expenses are going to fix emergencies
[and] take care of safety issues so that someone doesn't walk
out onto their deck and get injured . . . So I guess,
fundamentally, the challenge is we just really have not had
the funds to take care of the basic needs because we're
responding continually to some new emergency that arises. 73
E. The Association has increased the assessments to the maxim um level
allowed and has even special assessed its owners in order to make
immediate safety repairs.

Due to _its financial hardship caused by the construction defects, the Association
has been forced to increase the assessments as well as special assess the Gables' residents
to account and pay for necessary emergency repairs.
In November 2008, just 11 months after turnover, the board conducted a reserve
study more fully discussed below, which determined the Association was underfunded. 74
In 2009 the Association board voted to increase the assessments from $71 per unit to
$100 per unit because the reserve study indicated the Association was underfunded. 75 In
2011, "[t]he association held a meeting of all members and took a vote on doing a special
assessment of a thousand dollars per home in order to generate funds necessary to take
72

R. at 10602.
R. at 10604-05
74
See Addendum 10.
75
R. at 10618-19; see Addendum 11.

73
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care of some of the most urgent repairs such as the concrete that was collapsing and the
decks that were failing." 76 In 2015, a vote was held by the owners to increase the
assessment to $150 per month, the Association's "maximum monthly assessment" under
the Declaration. 77
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON CRITCHFIELD'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUS IN TWO RESPECTS
AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.

Critchfield filed a motion for summary judgment against the Association seeking
to dismiss the Association's implied warranty claims. The trial court granted
Critchfield's motion because the trial court determined that the Association lacked privity
of contract with the other parties, and because in the trial court's estimation, the
Association's expert reports did not contain enough information to determine whether the
defects alleged presented a question of safety or habitability.
The trial court's ruling on Critchfield's motion for summary judgment was
erroneous in at least two respects and should be reversed. First, the trial court's
determination that the Association lacked privity of contract with any other party was in
error because the Association enjoys privity of contract with the Developers through the
Declaration and as a third-party beneficiary to the Real Estate Purchase Contracts
("REPCs") and deeds between the Developers and the homeowners. Second, the trial
court's determination that the Association's expert reports did not adequately establish

76
77

R. at 10614.
R. at 10619.
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that the alleged defects presented safety or habitability concerns is in error because the
trial court was required to consider all inferences in a light most favorable to the
Association as the non-moving party.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE DEVELOPERS' MOTIONS
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT WAS ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE
REVERSED.
The Association established a prima facie case that the Developers grossly

underfunded the Association and therefore breached their limited fiduciary duties as
defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners

Ass'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, 221 P.3d 234. It was
undisputed that Duke established the Association, and had ultimate authority in setting
the original assessment amount, and grossly underfunded the Association. Now, the
Association and its Members have been placed in the impossible position of repairing the
damage caused by Builders' and subcontractors' defective construction, with a reserve
account that is grossly underfunded.
Despite the Association's compelling case and its experts' testimony including an
architect, a civil engineer, and general contractor, along with a licensed property manager
and two other concrete contractors, and the $890,000 deficit noted in Defendant's expert
report, the trial court granted Duke's motion for directed verdict ruling that" ... expert
testimony is ... required as a matter of law for Plaintiff to demonstrate the appropriate
standard of care and duties owed by a developer where it establishes and initially controls
a homeowners association." That ruling was in error and should be reversed.
Q
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON DUKE'S MOTION FOR
INDEMNIFICATION WAS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE
REVERSED.

Finally, the trial court erred in its ruling that Duke is entitled to indemnification
because the indemnification clause Duke relies upon does not arise only from his having
served on the board of the Association, but also from his role as a Developer.
Additionally, indemnification clauses like the one Duke relies upon should not be
enforced as a matter of public policy. Duke did not pursue his indemnification
counterclaim at trial, and should have been foreclosed from pursuing his claim via posttrial motion.
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's rulings and orders on Critchfield's
motion for summary judgment, the Developers' motions for directed verdict, and Duke's
motion for indemnification are all in error and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ASSOCIATION'S EXPERT REPORT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH A QUESTION OF SAFETY OR HABIT ABILITY

In its March 4, 2014 Ruling and Order, the Trial Court held that "expert testimony
is ... required to show that defects resulted in residences being unsafe or unfit for human
habitation," yet noted that the Association's expert need not use "the specific words
'safety' or 'habitability' to meet its burden." Ruling and Order, (R. 4092-4098; see
Addendum 12). The Trial Court also recognized that the Association's expert report
contains "two references to safety: the potential for water intrusion and trapping inside
the walls and on exterior surfaces, and the settling of parts of the concrete which could
22
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potentially lead to a tripping hazard . . ," yet concluded that the Association's expert
report contained insufficient evidence to support the contention that the units are unsafe
or uninhabitable. Id. Given the overwhelming evidence of water intrusion identified by
the Association's experts, and the Developers' and Third-party Defendants' experts, the
Court erred in determining that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the units are
either unsafe or uninhabitable.
Given the defects identified in the Association's expert reports, it is not a
significant leap to infer serious safety or habitability concerns. (R. at 2231-3133, 31773304; see Addenda 6, 7). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts and
inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sur.
Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, ,r 15, 10 P.3d 338, 340. In this case,

the inference was clear, and was ignored by the trial court. The fact that there was ample
testimony presented later at trial regarding the issue of safety or habitability underscores
the fact that at a minimum, at the time of the trial court's ruling, there were genuine
issues of material fact on the issue of safety or habitability.
In Davencourt, the Utah Supreme Court was presented with the Association's
allegations of "improper installation of stucco; improper stucco termination points at
slabs and foundations; ... missing or improper flashing; and missing, incomplete, or
improperly installed waterproofing at the foundations and walls of the units."
Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, if 6. The Court noted the defects resulted in water intrusion

"into the buildings through the foundation, floors, porches, stucco, sidewalls, exterior
walls, doors, windows, window boxes, and roofs" which in tum "caused damage to the
23
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buildings in the form of dry rot, mold, and staining." Id. Presented with the exact factual
scenario brought before the trial court in this case, the Utah Supreme Court adopted
broad implied warranties of habitability and workmanlike manner. In granting broad
protection to an innocent purchaser, the Court reasoned that failure to recognize such
implied warranties "is manifestly a denial of Justice." Id. at ,r 53. The Utah Supreme
Court did not get hung up on whether those defects presented safety or habitability
concerns. It was simply assumed. Id.
The Supreme Court noted that such warranties "are known by various names
[throughout the various states] such as 'habitability', 'quality', 'workmanship', or
'fitness"'. Id. Through the Davencourt opinion, Utah "join[ed] the overwhelming
majority of states" in recognizing an "implied warranty to the vendee that the residence is
constructed in a workmanlike manner and fit for habitation." Id. at ,rss. The Court
considered the "distinction, if any, between, an implied warranty of habitability and an
implied warranty of good quality and workmanship ... in decisional law throughout the
country" and ultimately concluded that "[i]n Utah, the scope of the implied warranty
should be construed broadly to comport with the public policy considerations [outlined
above]." Id. at ,r 56 (emphasis added).
The Trial Court's Ruling and Order overlooks the intent of the Davencourt
opinion and applies a standard narrower than has been adopted by any other state in the
nation. Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court expressed a clear intent to "join the
overwhelming majority of states" in recognizing broad implied warranties, the Trial
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Court should have considered the scope of those warranties as applied throughout the
country.
A survey of that law from other jurisdictions reveals that many jurisdictions refer
to the implied warranty of habitability as a warranty that a home be "fit for its intended
use." See, e.g., Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes, 690 P.2d 158, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
("home must be reasonably suited for its intended use"); Petersen v. Hubschman Constr.

Co., 389 N .E. 2d 1154, 1159 (Ill. 1979) ("we hold that implied in the contract for sale
from the builder-vendor to the vendees is a warranty that the house, when completed and
conveyed to the vendees, would be reasonably suited for its intended use"); Kirk v.

Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491,496 (Iowa 1985) ("[i]n construction contracts there is an
implied warranty that the building to be erected will be built in a reasonably good and
workmanlike manner and that it will be reasonably fit for the intended purpose");

Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co.,)43 N.W.2d 622,
626 (Minn. 1966) ("[i]n building and construction contracts ... it is implied that the
building will be erected in a reasonably good and workmanlike manner and will be
reasonably fit for the intended purposes."); Shisler v. Frank, 582 N.W. 2d 504 (Table), 5
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ("[ w]e therefore hold that there is an implied warranty of fitness for
the intended use in the contract for sale of a home or condominium from the buildervendor to the builder-vendee.").
The Supreme Court of Illinois specifically addressed the scope of the implied
warranty in stating:
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The mere fact that the house is capable of being inhabited does not satisfy
the implied warranty. The use of the term "habitability" is perhaps
unfortunate. Because of its imprecise meaning it is susceptible of
misconstruction. It would more accurately convey the meaning of the
warranty as used in this context if it were to be phrased in language similar
to that used in the Uniform Commercial Code, warranty of merchantability,
or warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., 389 N.E.2d at 1158 (emphasis added). North

Carolina similarly held that "the test of a breach of an implied warranty of habitability in
North Carolina is not whether a fixture is an "absolute essential utility to a dwelling
house." The test is whether there is a failure to meet the prevailing standard of
workmanlike quality. See Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 225 S.E. 2d 557 (1976)
(breach of standard of workmanlike quality, not "livability," is test of breach of
warranty). Gaito v. Auman, 327 S.E. 2d 870 (N.C. 1985).
Further, many jurisdictions have specifically held that water intrusion into a
residence due to defective construction constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability. See, e.g., Dial v. Graves, 351 So. 2d 598 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (holding that
leaking water, warped doors, mildewed walls made a home uninhabitable); Waggoner,
154 N.W.2d at 809 (holding that water seepage in the basement renders a home
uninhabitable); Sorensen v. Pickens, 585 P.2d 1275 (Idaho 1978) (upholding a lower
court ruling that a defectively constructed roof that leaks water constitutes a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability); Pike v. Kennedy, 730 N.W. 2d 209 {Table) (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 28, 2007) (holding that a leaking basement constitutes a breach of the implied
warranty that a home is constructed in a reasonably good and workmanlike manner and is
habitable); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky. 1969) (holding that faulty
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construction that led to water seeping into the basement was a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability); Industrial Roofing & Sheet v. J.C. Dellinger Mem'l Trust, 751
So. 2d 928, 939 (La.App. 2 Cir. Aug. 20, 1999) (holding that a leaky roof constitutes a
breach of the implied warranty of good workmanship); Berish v. Bornstein, 2770 N.E. 2d
961 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that for a home to be habitable it must keep out the
elements); Trentacostv. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (1980) (same). A Missouri court found a
home to be uninhabitable because there were slight cracks in the basement and garage as
a result of the soil settling even though the cracks did not lead to any significant leaking
of water into the home. See Schulze v. C & H Builders, 761 S.W.2d 219,223 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
In this case, as documented by the Association's expert witnesses, the Association
suffers from defects and damages caused by significant water intrusion which requires
substantial repair. To deny the Association a remedy under the implied warranties
adopted by the Supreme Court would represent a manifest injustice. See Davencourt ,r 53.
Experts on both sides in this case found and documented a number of construction
defects and damages-from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the units are
unsafe or uninhabitable, including, among others: (a) deterioration of underlying building
components (R. at 11008; see Addenda 6, 7); (b) moisture intrusion into the exterior
walls (R. at 10970-78, 11023-24; see Addenda 6, 7); (c) moisture intrusion into the deck
components (R. at 10600-01, 10984-11005; see Addenda 6, 7); (d) differential settlement
of the concrete steps relative to the building causing cracks and voids (R. at 10845,
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10864-65, 10885; see Addenda 6, 7), and (e) settling decks (R. at 10884-85; see Addenda
6, 7).
Because Utah has adopted implied warranties that must be construed broadly to
comport with the public policy considerations outlined in the Davencourt decision, and in
light of the overwhelming documented evidence of construction defects requiring costly
repairs, the Trial Court erred in issuing its March 4 Ruling and Order and should be
reversed.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ASSOCIATION
LACKED CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY WITH DEVELOPERS.
The trial court ruled in its March 4, 2014 Ruling and Order that the Association

lacked privity of contract with the Developers. (R. 4092-98; see Addendum 12). This was
in error and should be reversed. The Association enjoys privity of contract through the
Association's Declaration, and through the Association's status as third-party beneficiary
of the REPCs between the Developer Defendants and the Unit Owners. Furthermore,
public policy favors a finding of privity.

A. Privity of contract is established through the Association's Declaration.
Although the Davencourt opinion created a new duty running from Utah
developers to associations and did not directly address the privity issue, the existence of
privity between declarants and associations is well-grounded in established Utah law. In
Forest Meadow Ranch Property, the Court of Appeals found two types of privity exist
with an association formed by covenants. Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Ass'n,
L.L. C. v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2005 UT App 294, 118 P .3d 871. In that
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case, a party challenged the validity of certain covenants, conditions and restrictions,
claiming that they could not run with the land because Utah law requires that covenants
have privity. Id. at ,r 33; see also, Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776
P.2d 618, 622-3, 629 (Utah 1989) ("[a] covenant that runs with the land must have the
following characteristics: ... (3) there must be privity of estate").
The Court of Appeals agreed that privity is required for covenants to be
enforceable, and found that"[ w]hen investigating the existence of privity, substance
should prevail over technical form." Id. at if34 (internal citations omitted). Then, turning
to the facts before it, the Court of Appeals found that, even though the respondent
association had not existed at the time the covenants were recorded, privity still existed.
Id. at if35. The Court of Appeals looked at the substance of the case to find that, because
the contested covenants "were created in anticipation of subdividing and selling lots" that
"traditional" horizontal privity existed. Id. The Court of Appeals also found vertical
privity, because the association "is a successor to the estate of the original covenanting
parties." Id. (citing Utah case law that"[ v ]ertical privity exists in all covenant situation ..
. ." (citation omitted)).
The facts here clearly establish privity of both kinds found in Forest Meadow
Ranch. The Declaration is also an enforceable covenant requiring privity. Flying
Diamond Oil, 776 P .2d at 622-23. This is not an abstract, theoretical kind of privity. It
involves a clear give-and-take of valuable consideration. In this case, the Developers
originally owned the land that was ultimately conveyed to the Unit owners. When the
Developers recorded the Declaration, they severed the property rights, conveying some to
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the Association, and some to the Unit purchasers. Ibus, the Association enjoys just as
much privity with the Developers as do the individual Unit owners. The Association
received the right (and obligation) to maintain certain common property and accept all
owners as members, and in exchange, the property owner commits future owners to pay
assessments to the Association and to abide by certain standards. See Declaration,
Sections 3.1, 5.1, and 6.1, (R. at 2194-2222; see Addendum 1). The Association is a
successor in interest to the Developers vis-a-vis the common property. In Davencourt,
this Court limits implied warranty claims to contract-related parties because it does not
intend to create new causes of actions for non-contractual third parties, for example, for
trespassers or invitees to the property. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65,123. The Association,
as the actual and intended beneficiary of the sales contracts, and as a party to the
Declaration, is not, nor should it be, excluded from making claims on these grounds.
Therefore, the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
B. Privity of Contract is established through the Association's status as a
third-party beneficiary of the REPCs.
The Association also enjoys contractual privity with the Developers because it is a
third-party beneficiary to the REPCs and warranty deeds between the Developers and the
individual Unit Owners. In granting Critchfield's motion for summary judgment, the trial
court failed to recognize privity in this regard and should be reversed.
Third-party beneficiaries are "persons who are recognized as having enforceable
rights created in them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give
no consideration." 4 Corbin on Contracts §774 at 6 (1960); see Mason v. Tooele City,

30

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

484 P.2d 153 (Utah 1971); Clark v. American Standard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618 (Utah 1978)
(for a third-party beneficiary to have a right to enforce a right, the intention of the
contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party must be
clear); Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 440, 442 (Utah 2002) ("The existence of third party
beneficiary status 'is determined by examining a written contract' ... [t]he written
contract must show that the contracting parties 'clearly intended to confer a separate and
distinct benefit upon the third party."') (internal citations omitted); Tracy Collins Bank &

Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982) ("Where it appears from the
promise or the contracting situation that the parties intended that a third party receive a
benefit, then the third party may enforce his rights in the courts and is deemed a donee
beneficiary.").
Each original owner within the Gables at Sterling Village has direct privity with
the Developer through a REPC. The Association is no stranger to the purchase and sales
agreement for each unit. Because of the nature of the units, each purchase contract not
only transfers individual rights to the Units, but the contract also binds each purchaser to
the requirements and restrictions found in the Association's Declaration. See REPC,
section 10.1. (R. at 4194-95, 4230-32, 4292-4303; see Addendum 13). In exchange, each
purchaser, by signing the contract, is consenting to join the Association and abide by its
terms, including being bound by the Declaration. Id.; see Utah Revised Non-Profit

Corporation Act, U.C.A. § 16-6a-603(2) ("A person may not be admitted as a member
without the person's consent"); see also Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and

Restrictions of Gables at Sterling Village ("Declaration"), Article III, Section
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3.l("[e]very Owner shall be a Member of the Association.") (R. at 2202; see Addendum
1). The Association is a participant in that contract, at least as an intended third-party
beneficiary, as the purchase agreement was intended to transfer to the Association the
benefit of an additional paying member, and the right to enforce the Declaration, and, in
exchange, commit the Association to repairing common areas now owned by the
purchaser, which are enforceable at law. Id. at Article V, Section 5.1. The sale and
purchase of each unit was intended to benefit the Association, and was intended to give
the Association enforceable rights including, for instance, (1) the right to collect
assessments; (2) the right to enforce restrictions; and (3) the right and obligation to
maintain, repair, and replace the common property. Declaration, Article VI, Sections 6.1
- 6.2 (R. at 2206-08; See Addendum 1).
The warranty deeds issued by the developer to each purchaser/association member
also highlight the intent to bestow a benefit to the Association. In addition to conveying a
tract of land to the purchasers, those deeds also conveyed an easement to use and enjoy
the common areas and facilities. The deeds clearly underscore the benefit created in the
Association as a result of the sale of the property.
This case is typical, in that it involves a Developer whose only contractual ties
with the Association are through the Declaration and purchase contracts. If the
Declaration and REPCs did not create the necessary privity for the Association to bring
the implied warranty claims, then the Supreme Court's opinion in Davencourt requiring
privity would be rendered meaningless and nonsensical. No privity would ever exist and
no duty would ever be found under the application of that approach. Therefore, there is
32
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contractual privity between the Developers and the Association through the REPCs and
the warranty deeds. The trial court erred in holding otherwise, and should be reversed.

C. Public policy favors a finding of privity.
There are well established Utah public policies that favor a finding of privity of
contract in this matter. In the Davencourt decision, this Court stated that "[i]n Utah, the
scope of the implied warranty should be construed broadly to comport with the public
policy considerations." Davencourt ~ 56. If public policy requires implied warranty to be
"construed broadly," privity cannot be arbitrarily used to restrict the application of
implied warranty or other contract-based claims.
In another homeowner association case, Architectural Committee of the Mount
Olympus Cove v. Kabatznick, 949 P .2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Utah Court of

Appeals analyzed a related legal question of association standing, and saw "no reason to
require all landowners or any particular landowner in the subdivision to participate in this
action." The Kabatznick case involved a subdivision action to enforce restrictive
covenants where the defendant brought a motion to dismiss the committee complaint,
arguing that the association committee lacked standing and that the action could not
continue unless "the committee joined or substituted all committee members who also
owned property in the subdivision." Id. In denying the defendant's motion, the court
noted that the Utah Supreme Court has articulated the following policy considerations in
favor of association standing:
Associational standing has the advantage of permitting the prosecution of
legitimate claims by an entity with the capacity to spread the costs of
litigation among its members and to assume the burdens incident of it,
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rather than requiring a single litigant to carry the entire load. To deny an
association standing under such circumstances just might deter the assertion
of valid claims without serving any countervailing public purpose.
Id. at 779 (quoting Utah Restaurant Ass 'n v. Davis Cnt y Board of Health, 709 P.2d

1159, 1163 (Utah 1985). The idea of favoring associational standing is also consistent
with longstanding principles of encouraging judicial economy, as it is manifestly simpler
for the courts to administrate a single case with a single plaintiff rather than hundreds of
individual cases or even a single case with hundreds of individual plaintiffs/owners. Id.
In its Kabatznick decision, the Court of Appeals cites Conestoga Pines Homeowner 's
Ass 'n, Inc. v. Black, 689 P.2d 1176 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), noting that "the law in this

jurisdiction corresponds more closely to the Black analysis." Kabatznick, 949 P.2d at
779. In Black, the court noted that a homeowner association has a "representative
capacity" and can "seek[] to vindicate whatever rights its members may enjoy." Black,
689 P.2d at 1177. In doing so the court quoted the United States Supreme Court which
held that: An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted, nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S.
333 (1977)).
The public policy articulated in the Davencourt opinion, and the long-standing and
well-articulated Utah public policies that support association standing, weigh in favor of
finding that privity-based claims can be brought by an owners' association like the
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Association in this case. The maintenance and repair of the exterior surfaces of the units
is an obligation owned by the Association, which has been organized to represent the
interests of each individual Owner. See Declaration, Article VI, Section 6.l(c). (R. at
2206; see Addendum 1). This is consistent with the interest of each owner in a claim
under the implied warranty. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65,153. Therefore, public policy
favors a finding of privity, and the trial court should be reversed.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EXPERT
TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH A STANDARD OF
CARE FOR DEVELOPERS FOR PURPOSES OF DAVENCOURT
LIMITED FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS.
In its October 20, 2015 Ruling and Order granting Duke's motion for directed

verdict, (R. at 9818-23; see Addendum 14), the trial court held that "expert testimony is .
. . required as a matter of law for Plaintiff to demonstrate the appropriate standard of care
and duties owed by a developer where it establishes and initially controls a homeowners
association." Ruling and Order at 4, (R. at 9821). The trial court's conclusion was
erroneous in at least three respects. First, the Utah Supreme Court has previously defined
a developer's specific limited fiduciary duties in Davencourt, 2009 UT 65. Second, the
question of whether a developer breached its Davencourt duties is within the jury's
common knowledge. Finally, any opinion offered by a developer expert would be
objectionable as a legal conclusion on the ultimate issue pursuant to Rule 704 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. For these reasons, the trial court's October 19, 2015 Ruling and Order
should be reversed.
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A. The Utah Supreme Court previously defined the developer's specific,
limited fiduciarv duties in Davencourt.
Ironically, the trial court's own language contained in its October 20, 2015 Ruling
and Order illustrates why the trial court's ultimate conclusion is erroneous. Therein, the
trial court acknowledged that the Utah Supreme Court has already defined the
Developers' limited fiduciary duty. "[T]his case presents a situation that involves
determining whether a member of a professional trade (a property developer) breached
specific fiduciary duties to the homeowners association" (R. at 9821; see Addendum 14)
(emphasis added).The Utah Supreme Court did not merely establish that developers owe
general fiduciary duties to the Association and its homeowners, but went further and
narrowly and specifically defined the limited fiduciary duty. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65.
The difference is critical.
Ordinarily, in a run-of-the-mill negligence case involving a broad, general duty of
care, expert testimony is not required. "In a negligence case, ... the standard of care
defines the scope of duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff." Vitale for Christensen v.
Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). Some types
of claims may require expert testimony, where specialized knowledge is required to
understand the scope of the duty owed. This is not such a case. A developer is not part of
a specialized profession, and the duty owed by Developers to associations has already
been carefully and narrowly defined.
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Because of the inherent conflict of interest which would almost always run afoul
of broad fiduciary duties, the Davencourt Court chose instead to impose certain narrowly
defined, limited fiduciary duties.
We also embrace the Restatement's concept of the fine line drawn between
a typical fiduciary duty and this limited fiduciary duty. This concept arises
from the nature of the developer's relationship with the association and its
members. The Restatement expounds that '[t]reating the developer and its
appointees to the board as trustees overstates the fiduciary component of
the relationship.' Given the developer's self-interest, '[t]he developer
cannot be expected to act solely in the interests for the association and the
homeowners. Conflicts of interest are inherent in the developer's role while
it retains control of the association.' While the developer thus should not be
a fiduciary in the broadest sense, we are nonetheless convinced that the
developer's control in this nonprofit association requires certain interests of
the members and the association be protected. This is achieved by the
limited fiduciary duty.
Id. at ,r 3 7 (internal citation omitted).

The Supreme Court defined the developer's standard of care by explicitly
enumerating the following seven very specific (but limited) fiduciary duties:
(1) to use reasonable care and prudence in managing and maintaining the
common property;
(2) to establish a sound fiscal basis for the association by imposing and
collecting assessments and establishing reserves for the maintenance and
replacement of common property;
(3) to disclose the amount by which the developer is providing or
subsidizing services that the association is or will be obligated to provide;
(4) to maintain records and to account for the financial affairs of the
association from its inception;
(5) to comply with and enforce the terms of the governing documents,
including design controls, land-use restrictions, and the payment of
assessments;
(6) to disclose all material facts and circumstances affecting the condition
of the property that the association is responsible for maintaining; and
(7) to disclose all material facts and circumstances affecting the financial
condition of the association, including the interest of the developer and the
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developer's affiliates in any contract, lease, or other agreement entered into
by the association.
Id. at ,r,r 35-40. The Supreme Court's definition of the developer's limited duties is
the developer's standard of care, no expert testimony required.
Common sense illustrates why expert testimony would not be required. For
example, the second enumerated limited fiduciary duty requires the developer to establish
a sound fiscal basis for the Association. That is the requirement to satisfy the duty. Either
the developer established a sound fiscal basis or it did not. There is no nuance, and
standard of care expert testimony would be of little assistance in determining whether the
developer established a sound fiscal basis.
Likewise, under Davencourt the developer is required to disclose all material facts
and circumstances affecting the condition of the property that the association is
responsible for maintaining. Id. at 1 36. Either the developer disclosed all of the facts and
circumstances or it did not. There is no gray area, and expert testimony should not be
required to establish that the developer failed to disclose all material facts and
circumstances.
Even in a medical malpractice case, an expert may not be required if the duty and
breach thereof was obvious and well enough defined. See, e.g. Ekendahl v. Louisiana
Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 124 So. 3d 461 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2013) ("Expert testimony is
generally required in a medical malpractice action to establish an applicable standard of
care and whether or not that standard was breached, except where negligence is so
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obvious that a lay person can infer negligence without the guidance of expert
testimony.").
B. Whether a developer breached its Davencourt duties is within the
jury's common knowledge.

In its Ruling and Order dated October 20, 2015, the Trial Court "reject[ ed]
Plaintiffs argument that it is within common knowledge of a lay juror as to the standard
of care owed by a developer under Davencourt." Ruling and Order, p. 4 (R. at 9821; see
Addendum 14). The trial court's conclusion is erroneous and should be reversed because
specialized expertise of a developer is not required to determine whether assessment
levels are adequate to provide enough money in reserves to pay for necessary repairs, or
whether all material facts affecting the condition of the property were disclosed. Either
the assessments were sufficient to establish a sound fiscal basis, or they were not. No
specialized knowledge is necessary to make that determination. Either all material facts
were disclosed or they were not. No specialized knowledge would assist the jury in
making that determination. This point is emphasized by the fact that following turnover,
ordinary lay person voluntary board members that come from a variety of professions and
backgrounds essentially perform the same function of setting assessments and
establishing a sound fiscal basis for the Association.
Take, for example, the Developer's limited fiduciary duty to establish a sound
fiscal basis for the Association. That duty is a matter of law that has been issued by the
Utah Supreme Court. In this example, the appropriate standard of care under Davencourt
is that the developer has a duty to establish a sound fiscal basis. Davencourt, 2009 UT
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65,, 36. It is of little or no probative value for an expert developer to testify that the
developer owes a duty to ensure a sound fiscal basis. That is a matter of established law
that is the proper subject of jury instructions, and no specialized knowledge or testimony
is required to make that determination.
The only expert testimony that would be relevant or helpful to the jury on the
question of whether Duke and the Developers established a sound fiscal basis for the
Association is expert testimony on the scope and cost of necessary repairs so that the jury
could compare that scope and cost with the amounts that were set aside into reserves at
the initial established assessment level. The Association offered through expert testimony
that the cost of repair would be approximately $4,900,000. (See Addendum 3). The
Developers and Duke offered through their experts that the cost of repair was $890,000.
(See Addendum 4). It is within the purview of the jury to determine as a question of fact
which number is more accurate, or whether the appropriate amount lies somewhere in
between. It is a simple task for the jury to then apply the facts to the law as instructed by
the court and compare its figure with the amounts in the Association's reserve account.
Then the jury would be able to make a determination as to whether Duke and the
Developers established a sound fiscal basis for the Association.
In fact, Utah law mandates that HOA board members, who are largely lay people,
account for the maintenance of their association and assess the HOA's members
accordingly without the need of input from experts or licensed professionals. Utah Code
§ 57-8-7.5. Likewise, lay jurors can determine whether a developer established a
homeowners association with a sound fiscal basis without an expert. On November 26,
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2013, in a very similar case, the Honorable Judge Keith Kelly was faced with the same
issue on a motion for summary judgment. Judge Kelly ruled as follows:
... there are disputed issues of fact concerning whether the Developers
established a sound fiscal basis for the HOA. Additionally, the Court is
persuaded that the Utah Condominium Act allows an HOA to conduct its
own reserve studies, which indicates that no expert testimony is needed for
the Plaintiff to prove this portion of its claim.
(See Addendum 15). Judge Kelly recognized that because the statute authorizes

HOA boards to establish special assessments and reserve accounts without consulting an
expert, it follows that an expert witness is not required to testify as to the standard of care
on this issue.
The reserve fund was either sound when the developer turned the Association over
to the homeowners or it was not sound. Because the Association already established
construction defects and a cost of repair using construction experts, a jury is quite able to
handle the remaining task of determining whether there are sufficient funds in the reserve
to cover the construction repairs. Requiring a "developer expert" to inform the jury that
the Association was underfunded insults the jury, abuses the judicial process, wastes
judicial resources, and is wholly unnecessary.
C. Any opinion offered by a developer expert would be objectionable as a
legal conclusion on the ultimate issue, pursuant to URE 704.

Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that expert testimony is not
excludable solely because it goes to the ultimate issue. However, Rule 704 is not
intended to allow a witness to give a legal conclusion. Steffensen v. Smith 's Mgmt. Corp.,
862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). Because the Utah Supreme Court already established that
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developers owe certain well-defined fiduciary duties, an expert's opinion on the nature of
those duties, the standard of care, or whether those duties were breached would constitute
an expression of a legal opinion that would be objectionable.
For example, in Davencourt, the Utah Supreme Court held that a developer owes a
limited fiduciary duty "to disclose the amount by which the developer is providing or
subsidizing services that the association is or will be obligated to provide." Davencourt,
2009 UT 6, 1 36. It is difficult to imagine what a developer expert could say that would
not be a statement of a legal conclusion. If, for example, the expert testified that the
developer has a duty to disclose the amount of the subsidies, the expert would be offering
a legal conclusion previously established by Davencourt. If the expert testifies that
failure to disclose all subsidy amounts is a breach of the duty, the expert will have offered
a legal opinion on the ultimate issue.
A jury determining whether a developer complied with this limited fiduciary duty
only requires the most basic inquiry of whether the developer disclosed the information
or not. There is very little if anything that a developer expert could say that would be of
probative value.
Another Davencourt duty requires the developer "to disclose all material facts and
circumstances affecting the condition of the property that the association is responsible
for maintaining." Davencourt at 1 36. Either all of the material facts were disclosed or
not. There is nothing that a developer expert could say that would not be a legal
conclusion.
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Because the limited fiduciary duties are so well defined by the Utah Supreme
Court in Davencourt, there is very little probative value of expert testimony regarding the
standard of care. Therefore, expert testimony establishing the standard of care is not
necessary, and the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT
JEFFREY DUKE WAS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION.
In its January 12, 2016, Ruling and Order, the trial court ruled that Duke was

entitled to indemnification from the Association for his attorney fees and costs incurred
in defending this action. (R. at 10099-10103; see Addendum 16). The trial court erred in
its ruling because the indemnification clause Duke relies upon does not arise solely from
his having served on the board of the Association, but also from his role as a Developer.
Additionally, indemnification clauses like the one Duke relies upon should not be
enforced as a matter of public policy. Finally, Duke did not pursue his indemnification
counterclaim at trial, and should have been foreclosed from pursuing his claim via posttrial motion.

A. The indemnification clause found in the Articles of Incorporation does
not apply in this case because the Developers' independent fiduciary
duty is distinct from a corporate fiduciary duty.
The issue of determining the developer's fiduciary duties that the developer owes
a homeowners association dates back to 1981. In, Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v.
Knuppe Development Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334, like this case, the
homeowners association sued the initial directors and officers for certain common area
defects. One of the issues in that case was determining the developer's fiduciary duties.
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See id. There, the California appellate court held that "the initial directors and officers of
the Association had a fiduciary relationship to the homeowner members analogous to that
of a corporate promoter to the shareholders." Id. Thus, the court in that case determined
that the initial board members, including the developer, of a homeowners association
owed the association a broad corporate fiduciary duty. See id.
Utah Code Ann.§ 16-6-107(1) provides for indemnification of officers and
directors of nonprofit corporations, based on similar rationale that public policy
encourages competent persons to serve as trustees in nonprofit corporations by limiting
their personal liability for decisions made while serving in that capacity. See Reedeker v.

Salisbury, 952 P .2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Often, the articles of incorporation or
other governing documents of a nonprofit corporation will contain a similar
indemnification clause based on the same rationale.
This case presents a different scenario. The Utah Supreme Court recognized in

Davencourt that a developer serving on the homeowner association board is not a typical
director or officer of a nonprofit corporation and that special fiduciary duties apply.

Davencourt, 2009 UT 65. The Utah Supreme Court determined that a "developer" who
establishes and initially controls a homeowners association owes an "independent duty"
to the association distinct from other corporate members who are charged with broad
fiduciary duties. Id.
This "independent duty" for developers is distinct from the fiduciary duties with
which the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-822 (the
"Act"), charges directors and officers and for which it offers indemnification. See id. In
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Davencourt, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "While the [Utah Revised Nonprofit

Corporation Act] may serve as a basis for imposing a broad fiduciary duty in a nonprofit
setting, the inherent conflict that a developer faces in promoting and marketing property
for a profit, while simultaneously ensuring the interests of a homeowners association and
its members, causes us to look elsewhere." Davencourt, 2009 UT 65, ,35.
While Duke may have served on the Association's board, he was not sued solely
as a member of the Association's board. He was also sued as a director or officer of the
Developers, who is liable by virtue of his having personally participated in the breaches
of fiduciary duties. The distinction is critical, because the Association is not required to
indemnify principals of the Developers for breaches of the Developers' fiduciary duties.
Despite the Court's lack of specificity regarding the developer's fiduciary duties,
two points are clear from Davencourt: I) developers who initiate homeowners
associations owe the association a "limited fiduciary duty" that is also an "independent
duty of care" and 2) the standard of care is not a broad corporate fiduciary duty
established under the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act. See id.
Here, the source of this Defendant's liability is not the Utah Revised Nonprofit
Corporation Act. The source of this Defendant's liability as the developer is the limited
independent fiduciary duties established in Davencourt. Therefore, the indemnification
clause found in the Association's Articles of Incorporation subject to the Act, does not
apply to Duke as developer whose independent duties are found "elsewhere."
In the hypothetical case that a completely independent board member - one who
has no connection to the developer whatsoever - was serving on the initial board, that
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individual would not owe the independent fiduciary duty established in Davencourt. Such
an independent board member with no connection to the developer would owe corporate
fiduciary duties under the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act, but would not have
the obligation to provide a sound fiscal basis as well as other Davencourt duties. That
independent board member would be entitled to indemnification for his or her actions
while serving on the board under the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act and the
Association's governing documents. The Davencourt fiduciary duties are not tied to and
do not arise from the Developer's service on the Association's board. They are
completely independent, and are not subject to the indemnification provisions contained
in the Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act or the Association's governing
documents. The trial court's ruling on this issue is in error and should be reversed.

B. The indemnification clause should not be enforced as a matter of
public policy and equity.
Even if the Court were to ignore the distinction between a developer being sued
for breaches of independent fiduciary duties not tied to board service vs. claims directly
related to board service, the claims for indemnification nevertheless fail at common law.
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "[ a]n indemnity agreement may be invalidated as
violative of public policy where shown to have resulted from duress, deception, a

disparity of bargaining power, or negotiations conducted at less than arm's length."
Shell Oil Company v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Company 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983)
(citations omitted) ( emphasis added). Further, "[i]t is the policy of the law to look with
disfavor upon semi-concealed or obscured self-protective provisions of a contract
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prepared by one party, which the other is not likely to notice." Christopher v. Larson
Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 1976) (holding that fine print disclaimer of
implied warranty of merchantability on back of sales agreement was not effective).
Moreover, and in the event this Court determines that the indemnification provisions are
a contract between the Initial Board and the Association, the indemnification provisions
are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. See, Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P .2d
357 (Utah 1996). 78
In this case, there was a disparity of bargaining power when the indemnity clause
was drafted by the Defendant at a time when the Defendant controlled the Association not a typical "arm's length" transaction. The Developers drafted the articles of
incorporation, the bylaws, and the Declaration without any input from homeowners. In
other words, the Developers drafted their own indemnification language that was later
inherited by the homeowners after turnover. Compounding the problem, the indemnity
clause is obscure and hidden in the Association's Articles and Bylaws where a purchaser

78

In Christopher, the Court justified this policy, stating:
We think it is a correct and salutary rule, that where there are provisions of this
character in a contract, either buried in other provisions in fine print, or are otherwise
semi-concealed or secreted in some manner, such as being found only by reference to
the backside of the document, they should not be binding upon the signer (buyer)
unless it is shown that the provision was actually called to his attention.
Notwithstanding the fact that the face of the contract contained the reference to
'merchantability,' the actual disclaimer was among other fine print provisions of the
back thereof. Under the doctrine just set forth, in the absence of any evidence that this
disclaimer was called to the plaintiffs' attention, the defendant cannot insist that it be
effective as a waiver.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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is not likely to find it. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, the indemnification clause
in question should not be enforced and the trial court's ruling should be reversed.
C. The indemnification claim was a cause of action that should have been
tried to the jury, not by post-trial motion.
Duke originally brought his indemnification claim as a counterclaim. That
counterclaim was then virtually ignored until after trial, at which point Duke filed a
motion for indemnification. The time to raise claims is at trial, not after the jury has been
dismissed.
Before trial, the Association and the Developers, including Duke, attended a
pretrial conference with the trial court. Plaintiff and Defendant submitted pretrial
disclosures and jury instructions. Duke made no mention of indemnification at the
pretrial conference, in the pretrial disclosures, nor in the proposed jury instructions. Duke
also had the opportunity to appropriately request that this Court bifurcate the
indemnification claim from the liability claims. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
R.42(b). Yet, Duke did not make any motion for a separate trial.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(b) states: "Any party may
demand a trial by jury of any issue triable by right .... " Rule 38(c) states: "In his
demand a party may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be
deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable." Furthermore, Rule
38(d) states: "A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn
without the consent of the parties."
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Therefore, the right to a jury included the indemnification claim made in Duke's
counter-claim. The Association did not give its consent that Duke's counter-claim not be
tried by a jury. Thus, granting Duke's motion for indemnification deprived the
Association of an opportunity to have Duke's counterclaim tried by a jury.
During trial, Duke and the Developers moved for a directed verdict. Upon granting
the motion for directed verdict, the trial court made a point to ask the Association and the
Developers if there were any other matters to be raised before the case was closed. At
that time, Duke failed to raise his indemnification claim nor offer any proof of actual
incurred expenses. It was only after trial that Duke asked for indemnification from the
Court, which necessarily raises questions of fact that should have been presented to the
jury, such as whether Duke was acting in his capacity as a developer or whether he was
simply acting as a non-interested initial board member. In short, Duke's counterclaim for
indemnification should have been raised at trial, and should have been presented to the
jury. A post-trial motion for indemnification is simply insufficient.
Unlike cases in which attorneys' fees are allowable to the prevailing party, here
the attorneys' fees and costs are themselves part of the merits of Defendant's contractual
indemnification claim. See N Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Correctional Med. Servs. Inc.,
527 F.3d 1033, 1038-39 (10th Cir. 2008) (in jurisdictional decision, holding that
attorneys' fees and costs awarded as compensatory damages to insured are inseparable
from merits of insured' s breach of contract claim; distinguishing statutory prevailing
party attorneys' fees, which are collateral to the merits). Defendant does not seek the fees
"as an element of 'costs' awarded to the prevailing party," Budinich v. Becton Dickinson
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& Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200 (1988), which "raises legal issues collateral to and separate

from the decision on the merits." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather,
Defendant seeks the fees as the measure of damages resulting from the contractual
indemnification breach, "as an element of damages under a contract." 10 J. MOORE,
Moore's Federal Practice§ 54.171 [l][a] (3d ed. 2008) (noting such fees may present
"jury triable issues").

In United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 813
N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2012), plaintiff lender brought an action against defendant borrowers
on a mortgage, a promissory note, and guaranty agreements. The district court denied the
borrowers' motion to submit the question of reasonable attorney fees to the jury and
subsequently awarded the lender over $400,000 in attorney fees. On appeal, the court
reversed in part and remanded for a jury trial on the issue of attorney fees. Id. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded:"... [the lender's] request for attorney fees is a
legal claim with an attendant right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 4 of the
Minnesota Constitution."
Minnesota is among the many jurisdictions that follow this "common practice."
The Second Circuit in McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17570, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P97,661 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1993) stated, "Following
common practice, today we make law out of what was previously common sense: when a
contract provides for an award of attorneys' fees, the jury is to decide whether a party
may recover such fees; if the jury decides that a party may recover attorneys' fees, then
the judge is to determine a reasonable amount of fees." The Second Circuit reiterated this
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determination when it stated, "we hold that an action to recover attorneys' fees pursuant
to a contract presents traditional common-law contract issues which should be submitted
to a jury ... but that the subsequent determination of the amount of attorneys' fees owed
presents equitable issues of accounting which do not engage a Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial." Id.
Despite the fact that Duke formally alleged indemnification as a cause of action,
Duke treated his indemnification claim as if it were a motion for attorney fees. A cause of
action for indemnification is not the same as a motion for attorney fees. Duke should
have tried his indemnification to the jury for a determination as to whether he was
entitled to indemnification. Upon a finding that he was entitled to indemnification, then
Duke could have submitted his motion to the trial court for determination as to the
amount of fees and costs. In contrast, granting Duke relief on a cause of action post-trial
is inappropriate, and the trial court should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's rulings and orders on Critchfield's

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Developers' Motions for Directed Verdict, and
Duke's Motion for Indemnification are all in error and should be reversed.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2016.
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